Case Study
Water & Wastewater Cybersecurity

When a Textbook Design Fails the Real World

Redesigning an OT historian segmentation architecture around what the installed technology could actually support.

Project Reference
OT Historian Segmentation Architecture Design
Published
15 September 2026
Updated
15 September 2026
6 months
Engagement Duration
3
Architectures Evaluated
2
Stakeholder Workshops

Project Overview

A regional Australian water utility in Victoria was partway through a broader IT/OT network separation program with its Tier 1 consulting partner when a specific design did not survive contact with its own network. The consultancy's segmentation architecture for the utility's OT Historian followed every standard in the book: a middleware proxy sitting in an OT DMZ, bridging the OT and corporate networks in line with textbook best practice. The utility never built it. The design assumed capabilities the installed historian platform, AVEVA Historian (formerly Wonderware), simply did not have. Rather than force a design that did not fit its real environment, the utility asked Parasyn to work out what actually would.

The Challenge

The utility's production Historian sat inside the corporate network, historising operational data from SCADA and making it available to corporate users over the corporate LAN and VPN, a direct path between corporate IT and operational data that needed closing to align with IEC 62443 zone and conduit principles and to support obligations under the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (SOCI Act). A standards-correct answer already existed on paper. What was missing was an architecture grounded in how the utility's specific historian platform actually worked: its data flow, its proprietary protocols, its licensing model, and what its vendor would and would not support in a segmented deployment. Without that grounding, a technically sound-looking design could be, and had been, impossible to actually build.

The Parasyn Approach

Parasyn started from the platform itself rather than from segmentation theory:

  1. Vendor-grounded investigation
    Direct discussions with the historian vendor to confirm exactly which deployment patterns the platform could support, rather than relying on generic segmentation patterns.
  2. Two detailed workshops
    Structured sessions walking the utility's OT, IT and cyber security stakeholders through three candidate architectures and the reasoning behind each.
  3. Deep platform expertise applied
    Understanding of historian data flow, proprietary OEM protocols, interface details and licensing strategy, knowledge a generic architecture pattern cannot substitute for.
  4. Structured evaluation
    Candidate architectures scored against cyber security and IEC 62443 alignment, SOCI Act obligations, IT/OT dependency, and technical feasibility.

Architectures Considered

Three representative options were assessed in detail:

Middleware Proxy in the OT DMZ
The original design, standards-aligned pattern already designed by the utility's Tier 1 consulting partner. It was never implemented: the installed historian platform does not provide a separate store-and-forward component that can act as a proxy in the OT DMZ, so the design was not technically buildable with the utility's actual technology.
Single Historian Relocated to the OT DMZ
Technically workable, but it left corporate users and external systems connecting directly into the OT-side DMZ, an increase in threat surface that does not sit well with best-practice tiered architecture for critical infrastructure.
Dual-Historian Segmented Model (Recommended)
A Tier 1 historian retained inside the OT domain, replicating data one way only to a Tier 2 historian in the corporate network, with no corporate access back into OT and no direct corporate connection to the OT historian at all.

The Outcome

The recommended dual-historian architecture is not only standards-aligned on paper, it is grounded in what the utility's actual historian platform can support, giving the utility confidence this design would not repeat the earlier attempt's fate:

✓
Reduced blast radius
A corporate-side compromise is far less likely to reach into SCADA, since no corporate system connects directly to the OT historian.
↑
Clear separation of duties
The OT-side historian handles operational data collection, the corporate-side historian handles corporate access and reporting, with no crossover.
★
Standards alignment
A zones-and-conduits architecture consistent with IEC 62443, supporting the utility's SOCI Act obligations.
∞
Room to grow
The corporate-side historian can be extended to new data sources and integrations later without increasing risk to OT operations.

With the architecture decided and the rationale grounded in the utility's real environment, Parasyn handed the recommendation back to the utility with a clear, buildable basis to progress into detailed design and implementation planning.

Why Parasyn

This engagement is a reminder that a segmentation design is only as good as the vendor-specific knowledge behind it. A textbook-correct architecture had already been designed for this utility and never built, because it assumed capabilities the installed historian platform did not have. Parasyn's redesign started from the platform itself: its data flow, its protocols, its licensing model, and what its vendor would actually support, then built the security boundary around that reality rather than around a generic pattern. You cannot design a security boundary without first understanding the engine inside it.