Case Study
Water & Wastewater Cybersecurity

A Practical First Step Toward OT Cyber Resilience

Preliminary cyber security review for a regional water and wastewater utility, delivered by Parasyn as the client's existing OT engineering partner.

Project Reference
Preliminary OT Cyber Security Review
Published
15 September 2026
Updated
15 September 2026
6 weeks
Engagement Duration
10
Focus Areas Assessed
2
Stakeholder Workshops
3
Roadmap Phases

Project Overview

A regional local council in northern Queensland, Australia, responsible for water and wastewater services across multiple treatment plants and pumping stations, engaged Parasyn to carry out a preliminary cyber security review of its operational technology (OT) environment. The council already worked with Parasyn as its engineering delivery partner for SCADA and control systems support, and this engagement extended that existing relationship into cyber security advisory.

The Challenge

One exchange during the review captured the gap Parasyn was there to help close. Asked whether the council could see its full OT asset inventory, the IT team was confident: they had a solid list of their servers. But when the conversation turned to the PLCs, the RTUs and the field instruments out at the treatment plants, the answer was that those belonged to the treatment team, who were not in the room. From an IT perspective, the environment looked well understood. In reality, a significant part of the OT estate, the pumps and dosing systems that actually move and treat the water, was effectively invisible to central oversight.

That kind of gap is not unique to this council, and it sits inside a threat landscape that is getting worse nationally: ASD's Annual Cyber Threat Report 2024-25 recorded a 111% year-on-year increase in notifications to critical infrastructure entities about malicious activity on their networks. Water and wastewater operators are under growing pressure to demonstrate OT cyber resilience as a result, driven by the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (SOCI Act) and a broader shift in expectations from state and federal government. Like many regional operators, the council had no formally documented view of its OT cyber security posture: asset inventories, network architecture, remote access arrangements and incident response readiness had grown organically over time rather than being centrally managed and reviewed. Before committing to a full, formal risk assessment program, the council needed a fast, practical way to understand its exposure and prioritise next steps.

The Parasyn Approach

Parasyn designed the review as a non-intrusive, discovery-based assessment rather than a technical penetration test, run over six weeks from kickoff to final report:

  1. Stakeholder alignment
    A structured kickoff session with the council's IT and OT teams to confirm scope, objectives and intended audience.
  2. Discovery workshops
    Dedicated sessions with the IT team and the SCADA/operations team, covering architecture, access pathways and day to day operational practice.
  3. Architecture review
    A tabletop review of the available high level network architecture diagram, covering connectivity, remote access mechanisms and site relationships.
  4. Standards aligned analysis
    Findings assessed against IEC 62443, the leading international framework for OT cyber security, to produce practical, prioritised recommendations rather than a compliance audit.

What the Review Covered

The review examined ten focus areas spanning technical and procedural OT cyber security practice:

Asset Visibility and Inventory
Whether OT assets are documented in a centralised, structured way.
Network and Architecture Documentation
Currency and completeness of network diagrams and topology records.
Backup and Recovery
How OT software and configuration backups are taken, stored and tested.
IT/OT Network Segmentation
How consistently OT systems are separated from the corporate network.
Remote Access Governance
How remote access to SCADA systems is authenticated, session managed and monitored.
Patch and Firmware Management
How OT systems and devices are kept current and supportable.
Removable Media Control
Controls over USB and portable media use around OT systems.
Access and Session Management
Session timeout, account lifecycle and application level access control.
Incident Response Readiness
Whether a documented, rehearsed OT incident response plan exists.
Centralised Logging and Monitoring
Consistency of event logging and visibility across OT systems.

The Outcome

Rather than a static list of findings, Parasyn delivered a phased improvement roadmap the council could act on immediately:

  1. Phase 1: Initial Risk Containment
    Completing the foundational asset inventory and network documentation, alongside short-term risk reduction actions across the other focus areas.
  2. Phase 2: Baseline Foundation
    Establishing ongoing OT security processes and internal review practices.
  3. Phase 3: Structured Cyber Security Program
    A risk based program formally aligned with IEC 62443, including a future formal risk assessment.

This gave the council a clear, achievable starting point rather than an overwhelming compliance burden, while establishing the foundation for a longer-term OT cyber security maturity program.

Why Parasyn

This engagement reflects how Parasyn works with critical infrastructure clients: as a partner that delivers as well as advises. Because Parasyn was already engineering and supporting the council's SCADA and control systems, the cyber security review could draw on real operational context from day one, rather than starting cold. That combination, engineering delivery credibility paired with dedicated OT cyber security expertise, is what differentiates Parasyn from design-only consultancies advising from the outside.